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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of threshold traitor tracing for digital
content where, by embedding appropriate digital patterns into the dis-
tributed content, it is possible to trace and identify the source of unau-
thorised redistribution.
We use a set of marking assumptions where the adversaries have varying
powers change or erase coordinates of the fingerprint where their individ-
ual fingerprints differ–and consider the implications.
We consider codes derived from combinatorial designs–and develop a
method for concatenating the block design code to filter out the false
positives and defend against some of the attacks considered.
Keywords: Traitor tracing, fingerprinting, digital rights management, cod-
ing theory, block designs, Reed-Solomon codes.
1 Introduction
Fingerprinting (see [4, 2, 1]) is a technique that aims to prevent the unau-
thorized redistribution of digital content. Identical or very close copies of
a digital document are made available to a large number of authorized
users. The locations where the copies differ, are where the fingerprint has
been embedded into the digital object. Malicious users attempt to dis-
cover the fingerprint and alter it to construct rogue copies which will still
“function”. The document is assumed to be a string over a finite alpha-
bet, with the fingerprint being a randomly spread-out substring of the
former, but much shorter than the document itself. Traitor Tracing (see
[5, 3]) schemes enable the tracing of the user(s) whose fingerprints were
used to construct the rogue copies. Here we are interested in tracing more
powerful attacks–given in the example below.
2Example 1. For two coalitions drawn from codewords 01234 and 00224
10323 we exhibit some descendants below:
codeword codeword
traitor1 0 1 2 3 4 traitor1 0 1 2 3 4
traitor2 0 0 2 2 4 traitor3 1 0 3 2 3
narrow 0 0 2 3 4 narrow 1 1 3 3 3
wide 0 4 2 # 4 wide # 0 3 # 4
erasure 0 # 2 # 4 erasure # # # # #
hybrid 0 # 2 3 4 hybrid 1 # 2 3 #
type descendant type descendant
(1)
In a narrow attack, which has been widely studied, the attackers can
choose any symbol which already appears in their copies at that location.
Recently Tardos [11] has introduced an efficient solution. In a hybrid
attack, the attackers are forced to erase symbols at locations where their
copies mismatch. In a hybrid attack, the attackers can switch between the
narrow and erasure attacks, position by position. In the wide attack they
can choose any symbol from the alphabet or erase the location whereever
their copies differ.
We have recently considered this hierarchy of attacks [7, 8] and demon-
strated that the wide attack can be reduced to a hybrid attack–by the
method of alphabet boosting–though at the cost of a considerable over-
head in terms of expanding the codelength. Here, we focus on the details
of tracing the hybrid and erasure attacks, after a brief overview of the
attack hierarchy.
2 Attacks on Fingerprinting Schemes
The symbol v denotes a vector; v(i) is its i-th coordinate. We assume the
finite alphabet Q to be Fq, wherever convenient.
Definition 1. A code M is a subset of words from FNq . A linear code is
a vector subspace of FNq .
2.1 Attack Taxonomy
We identify each user with the unique codeword that she has been as-
signed. A coalition is a set of attackers. We then ask: (i) What can a
coalition do? (ii) How large can a coalition be?
3Definition 2. Let C(M, ω) denote the collection of all possible coalitions
of M with size at most ω: C(M, ω) = {A ⊆M : |A| ≤ ω} .
Definition 3. Let A ⊆ FNq . The spectrum of A at the z-th coordinate is,
spec(A, z) =
{
v(z) : v ∈ A} .
Definition 4. Let T ∈ C(M, ω). The word d is a narrow descendant of
the coalition T , denoted d ∈ Ndescω(T ) provided, for 1 ≤ z ≤ N,
d = (d(1), . . . , d(N)) where d(z) ∈ spec(T , z). (2)
Definition 5. For any code M, the set of all narrow descendants from
coalitions of size ≤ ω is denoted:
NDescω(M) =
⋃
T ∈C(M,ω)
Ndescω(T ) (3)
Note that {T : d ∈ Ndescω(T )} is the set of all coalitions that could
construct the descendant d. The set of codewords that must have been
used to construct the descendant d is its Trace:
Definition 6 (Trace). The trace of the descendant d is:
traceω(d) =
⋂
{T :d∈Ndescω(T )}
T . (4)
2.2 Strength of Codes Resisting the Narrow Attack
It was shown by Staddon et al. [9] that if the minimum distance of M
is ≥ N(1− 1
ω2
), any descendant is traceable to at least one traitor, using
M. In general, the strength of a code determines the ease of detecting
or tracing a coalition(see e.g., [9, 10]). In this paper, we design codes for
more general attacks.
Definition 7 (Extended Alphabet). Let Q# = Q∪{#} be the exten-
sion of the finite alphabet Q.
Definition 8 (Wide Attack). Let M have codelength N and alphabet
Q. The coalition T ∈ C(M, ω) can choose any descendant d = (d(1), d(2), . . . , d(N))
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
d(i) ∈
{
spec(T , i), if | spec(T , i)| = 1
Q# else.
4We define the special cases of the wide attack informally due to space
constraints:
The Erasure Attack, where a coalition is restricted to converting the
ith symbol to # whenever | spec(T , i)| > 1.
The Hybrid Attack, where for each coordinate, the coalition selects
whether they employ an erasure or a narrow attack.
The narrow, erasure and hybrid attacks need to be defended against if
we are to defend against the wide attack. The descendant sets EDescω(M),
HDescω(M), and WDescω(M) can be defined in analogy with those for
the narrow attack and obey:
Lemma 9. ∀M, with ω ≥ 2 we have: (i) NDescω(M) ⊂ HDescω(M).
(ii) EDescω(M) ⊂ HDescω(M). (iii) HDescω(M) ⊂WDescω(M).
(iv) NDescω(M) ∩ EDescω(M) = ∅.
3 Defending Against the Various Attacks
3.1 Tracing the Erasure Attack
Note that since most codes have codewords that are very far apart, a
classical erasure decoding approach won’t work here.
Definition 10 (Coalition Erasure Profile). Consider a coalition T ,
let ET be defined by, ET = {(i, spec(T , i)) : |spec(T , i)| = 1} .
The erasure profile ET also obeys ET =
⋂
f∈T Ef . Note that, Ef =
E{f} =
{
(i, f (i)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} , i.e., Ef is the erasure profile of a coalition
containing only the codeword f . Given d ∈ Edesc(T ), the erasure profile
is simply the sets of pairs (i, d(i)) of the descendant that haven’t been
erased:
ET =
{
(i, d(i)) : d(i) 6= #, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
. (5)
To construct a code that is resistant to an erasure attack we impose two
conditions: (i) ET must be nonempty for all coalitions T ; (ii) To ensure
that every coalition can be uniquely defined by ET , we require:
T1 6= T2 ⇔ ET1 6= ET2 , ∀T1, T2 ∈ C(M, ω). (6)
We have an erasure profile analog to the minimum distance dM of a code
M.
Definition 11 (Minimum Erasure Profile). Let M be a code and let
C(M, ω) be given by Definition 2. The minimum erasure profile eproM is
given by,
eproM = minT ∈C(M,ω)
|ET |. (7)
5Note that, eproM may equal zero. For tracing descendants d ∈ EDesc(M),
we are only interested in codes with eproM > 0.
Each component of the erasure profile contains tracing information
about the coalition that constructed it.
Definition 12 (Partial Trace). Given the Erasure profile of a coalition
ET , the partial trace for the coalition T on the pairs (i, x) ∈ ET is
Bi,x =
{
f ∈M : f (i) = x} .
The full trace can be obtained from the partial trace.
Definition 13 (Trace of Erasure Profile). Given an Erasure profile
ET , the intersection of all partial traces gives the list (trace) of all possible
codewords that could make up the coalition T .
trace(ET ) =
⋂
(i,x)∈ET
Bi,x (8)
For a code to be traceable, we impose the requirement trace(ET ) = T .
Lemma 14. The erasure profile ET is traceable to the coalition T if
trace(ET ) = T .
Proof. Let T be a coalition and let ET be its corresponding erasure pro-
file. Each codeword f ∈ T must be in trace(ET ) since f ∩ Bi,x 6= ∅
for each (i, x) ∈ ET . If there is no other codewords in trace(ET ) then,
trace(ET ) = T and the coalition is traced. 2
3.2 Tracing the Hybrid Attack
For a hybrid descendant d, we define the corresponding profile as the
“tracing profile”.
Definition 15 (Tracing Profile). For any descendant d ∈ HDescω(M),
the tracing profile of d is given by,
Id =
{
(i, d(i)) : d(i) 6= #, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
. (9)
Note that this appears to be the exact same definition as for the
erasure profile ET (see Definition 10). The key difference here is that
ET represents the set of (coordinate, value) that a coalition can’t erase,
where as Id is the set of (coordinate, value) that a coalition has not
deleted.
6Definition 16 (Trace of hybrid attack). The trace of a descendant
d ∈ HDescω(M) is the intersection of all coalitions T ∈ C(M, ω) which
can construct d. A coalition T can construct d provided T ∩Bi,z 6= ∅ for
all (i, z) ∈ Id. The intersection of all such coalitions gives all codewords
required to construct the descendant d, i.e.,
trace(d) =
⋂
{T : d∈Hdesc(T )}
T . (10)
It has been noted in [7] that the hybrid attack can be defended against
by using codes described in the next section, which have been designed
against the erasure attack, for slightly smaller coalition sizes. We don’t
consider this further in this paper.
3.3 Tracing the Wide Attack
We have shown in [7, 8] that tracing wide descendants is equivalent to
tracing hybrid descendants, subject to a failure probability which can be
made small enough, at the cost of increasing the codelength. Therefore,
we don’t consider the wide attack in the sequel.
4 Vector Space Block Design Codes (VSBDCs)
A VSBDC is a type of Resolvable BIBD [12], constructed by using the
set of all (ω− 1)−dimensional quotient vector spaces of a vector space V.
We give an example of a VSBDC with ω = 3; See [8] for more.
Example 2. Let V = Z32 . The VSBDCM = BDC(V,BV,2) is constructed
from the set of all vector subspaces of V with dimension 2, denoted SV,2.
The codewords in BDC(V,BV,2) are
vB(000) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) , vB(001) = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2) ,
vB(010) = (1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2) , vB(100) = (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2) ,
vB(011) = (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1) , vB(101) = (2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1) ,
vB(110) = (2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1) , vB(111) = (2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2) .
(11)
The set AT , defined below, is the V-representation of the set of par-
tition vectors in the coalition T :
Definition 17. Consider a coalition T of ω codewords from the vector
space block design code BDC(V,BV,ω−1). Then AT consists of all vectors
a in V that satisfy: AT =
{
a : vBV,ω−1(a) ∈ T , a ∈ V
}
.
7Similarly, we can also redefine the partial trace Bi,x.
Definition 18. Let M be the code BDC(V,BV,k). We now represent
the partial trace Bi,x (see Definition 12) by the vectors in V that con-
struct the codewords in T instead of the codewords themselves. i.e., Bi,x ={
a : v(i)BV,k(a) = x, a ∈ V
}
, where v(i)BV,k(a) is the i-th coordinate of the
partition vector vBV,k(a).
We characterize the partial trace below, but omit the long proof given
in [7].
Theorem 19. LetM be the vector space block design code BDC(V,BV,ω−1),
where V = Fnq . Let T ∈ C(M, ω). The partial trace of ET is the coset gen-
erator [AT ]V . i.e.,
ptrace(ET ) =
⋂
(i,x)∈ET
Bi,x = [AT ]V . (12)
Note that the VSBDC has the desirable property that any coalition
of size ω must have at least one coordinate where all codewords are equal
(since every coalition T must have a non empty erasure profile ET ). This
property enables a partial trace of the descendant which will contain the
coalition plus other codewords (spoof words). We use concatenated codes
to get around this problem.
Definition 20 (Concatenated Vector Space Block Design Code).
A CVSBDC M consists of an inner code MI = BDC(FNIq ,BFNIq ,k), an
outer codeMO ⊂ FNOqNI and a scalar preserving homomorphism ϕ : FNIq 7→
(FqNI ,+). Its codewords are constructed as follows:
M =
{
vB
(
ϕ−1(f (1))
)
, . . . ,vB
(
ϕ−1(f (NO))
)
: f ∈MO
}
where B is the set of quotient vector spaces BV,k, and
f = (f (1), f (2), . . . , f (NO)).
We cannot use a linear code as MO as this re-introduces the prob-
lem of spoof words at the outer code level. In [8, 7], we have introduced
δ-nonlinear codes–in the form of modified GRS codes–to get around this
problem. These are codes where the sum of δ or fewer codewords is not
a codeword, and are obtained by applying a special type of permutation
polynomial to Generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) codewords–see [6] for de-
tails on GRS codes–which are MDS codes attaining the Singleton bound,
and have length N, dimension k and minimum distance N − k + 1.
8The δ-nonlinearity property ensures that the partial trace of the con-
catenated code would only contain the coalition T plus other non-codewords
which can be discarded leaving only the coalition. See [7] for the proof,
as well as the example of a concatenated vector space block design code
(CVSBDC) below.
Example 3. Let V be the vector space F22. There are 3 vector subspaces
H1,H2,H3 of V with dimension 1. The set of all quotient vector spaces
with dimension 1, BV,1, is:
BV,1 =


H1︷ ︸︸ ︷
{00, 01}, {10, 11}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V/H1
,

H2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{00, 10}, {01, 11}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V/H2
,

H3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{00, 11}, {01, 10}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V/H3

.
From BV,1, we generate the inner code MI = BDC(V,BV,1);
MI =
{
vBV,1(00), vBV,1(01), vBV,1(10), vBV,1(11)
}
= {111, 122, 212, 221} .
Here vBV,1(01) = 122 is the partition vector of 01 ∈ V. Now, let MO ⊆
F44 be the outer code with a codeword f = (0, α, 1, α2) (α is a primitive
element of F4).
A suitable choice of scalar preserving homomorphism ϕ : F22 −→ (F4,+)
is:
x ∈ F22 ϕ(x) ∈ F22 ϕ(x) as αi
00 0 0
01 1 α0
10 α α1
11 α+ 1 α2
(13)
We construct the concatenated codeword as follows: The first coordinate
of f is f (1) = 0, applying the inverse of ϕ we get the vector 00. The corre-
sponding partition vector is vBV,1(00) = 111. The second, third and fourth
coordinates give us the partition vectors 212, 122 and 221. The concate-
nated codeword is then (111, 212, 122, 221). We can apply this process to
all the codewords in MO to construct M.
Given a concatenated code M, and a descendant d ∈ EDescω(M),
what the partial trace of the erasure profile? If we view the concatenated
code at the inner level, then the partial trace of the concatenated code
is simply the sequence of partial traces for each inner code segment. We
call this the “concatenated partial trace”.
9Definition 21 (Concatenated Partial Trace). Let M be a CVSBDC
with outer code MO and inner code MI . Let T ∈ C(M, ω) be a coalition
of the concatenated code. Let TO be the codewords in MO that generate
the concatenated codewords in T . Let T (i) ∈ C(MI , ω) be the coalition
of inner codewords that are inserted into each codeword of TO at the i-
th coordinate. The concatenated partial trace of the erasure profile ET
denoted Cptrace(ET ), is the sequence of NO partial traces for each inner
coalition T (i). i.e., Cptrace(ET ) =
(
ptrace(ET (1)), . . . ,ptrace(ET (NO))
)
.
Note that, if the inner codeMI is a VSBDC, then by Theorem 19 the
concatenated partial trace is Cptrace(ET ) =
(
[T (1)]Fnq , . . . , [T (NO)]Fnq
)
.
The concatenated partial trace is useful for viewing the code at the inner
level; at the outer level, we need to use a “coset image”.
Definition 22 (Coset Image). Consider Fnq and Fqn. For a given scalar
preserving homomorphism ϕ : Fnq −→ (Fqn ,+) and a given subset A ⊆
Fqn, a coset image [A]ϕ is [A]ϕ = ϕ
(
[ϕ−1(A)]Fnq
)
is:
[A]ϕ =
{
a+
∑
b∈A
λb(b− a) : λb ∈ Fq, b ∈ A
}
, for any a ∈ A, (14)
where ϕ−1(A) = {ϕ−1(a) : a ∈ A} ⊂ Fnq .
The components λb are over the subfield Fq and not the field Fqn . The
coset image contains ≤ q|A|−1 elements of Fqn . We can show that we can
construct the concatenated partial trace by using a coset image on the
outer code MO, see [7] for the proof.
Theorem 23. Let M be a CVSBDC as defined in Definition 20. Let
T ∈ C(M, ω) be a coalition and let TO and T (i) be as defined in Definition
20. The coset image [TO]ϕ can generate every partial trace of the erasure
profiles ET (i) via ptrace (ET (i)) = [T (i)]Fnq = ϕ−1 (spec([TO]ϕ, i)) .
5 Conclusions
We have investigated powerful attacks against fingerprinting schemes used
for securing digital content and described new types of codes which can
be used to defend against such attacks. We have made use of resolvable
BIBDs (Balanced Incomplete Block Designs) in order to construct new
code families we call VSBDC (Vector Space Block Design) codes. These
codes, used with concatenation techniques, are resistant to narrow, era-
sure, and as far as experimentally observed, to hybrid attacks.
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There are efficient algorithms for decoding Reed Solomon codes, which
could be applied to the δ-nonlinear Generalized Reed Solomon codes. The
algorithms for decoding the BIBD based component of the concatenated
codes could be based on linear algebra operations for computing cosets
and subspaces, and thus have a priori complexity no worse than a small
power of the codelength, which is given by an appropriate q−binomial
coefficient (see [7]). It remains an open problem to obtain more efficient
decoding algorithms for the design based codes.
The main contribution of this paper is an explicit–nonrandomized–
coding construction for addressing erasure and other attacks in digital
fingerprinting.
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